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E-mail addresses: cmarquis@hbs.edu (C. MarquisA number of studies have shown that, as a result of the ambiguity of US legal mandates,
organizations have considerable latitude in how they comply with regulations. In this
paper, we address how the different agendas of the federal and state governments increase
ambiguities in state-ﬁrm relations and how states are interested actors in creating oppor-
tunities for ﬁrms to navigate the federal legislation. We analyze the institutional forces
behind bank acquisitions within and across state lines in order to illuminate the ways that
US states take advantage of federal ambiguity and are able to shape corporate practices to
their beneﬁt. We speciﬁcally examine how patterns of bank acquisitions are shaped by the
crucial relationship between the federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and a little-
understood provision in the federal tax code that is implemented at the state level, the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). The relationship is complex because, while the
federal government uses the CRA to control bank acquisition activity, states promote use
of the LIHTC, through which banks can address federal CRA concerns, and thereby promote
bank acquisitions in their jurisdictions. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest that the implementation
of social legislation at one level in a federal regulatory system undermines the mechanisms
of social legislation at another level. We use archival research and in-depth interviews to
examine the interaction between these institutional processes and formulate hypotheses
that predict the ways in which bank acquisitions are constrained by banks’ CRA ratings
and the way states in turn help banks overcome their CRA constraints. Quantitative anal-
yses of all bank acquisitions in the United States from 1990–2000 largely support these
hypotheses.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
US states must balance many, sometimes conﬂicting constituencies when creating social policy. On the one hand they are
guardians of the public good, and on the other hand, they must encourage business expansion and growth to develop vibrant
local economies. In this paper, we explore the complex and multi-layered process in which US states regulate the corporate
sector and facilitate the consolidation of business and capital. Key changes in the US federal tax code over the last quarter-
century have allowed states to ﬁnd new ways to balance and integrate the dual missions of protecting the public good and
encouraging business expansion. In the case we examine, states have been able to take advantage of a federal tax credit
system to help corporations deal with an ambiguous regulatory issue that constrains their ability to acquire other ﬁrms.
Thus, this case shows that one of the ways for states to consolidate business and capital is to help corporations deal with. All rights reserved.
prior version of this paper.
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industry structure reﬂects variation in state activism.
Organizational theory has long been interested in how legal environments inﬂuence corporate activities. Shifts in federal
laws have been shown to cause corporations to interpret their environments differently and to inﬂuence the economic deci-
sions of organizations. Research has shown that ﬁrm structure (Fligstein, 1990; Roy, 1997; Zorn, 2004), strategy (Davis et al.,
1994), and even internal policy (Dobbin et al., 1993; Edelman, 1990, 1992; Sutton et al., 1994) are shaped by legal changes at
the federal level. For example, Fligstein (1990) showed how a number of federal regulatory changes in the twentieth century
drove the evolution of the corporate form. Similarly, legislation during the Reagan era led to changes in the legitimate cor-
porate structure, which then shaped corporate acquisition and divestiture patterns (Davis et al., 1994). Some scholars have
observed the effects of federal laws and regulations on organizations to be so powerful as to matter above and beyond eco-
nomic efﬁciency (Roy, 1997).
A number of studies have examined the effects of state laws, either as microcosms to understand regulatory effects on
organizations more generally (e.g. Dobbin and Dowd, 1997, 2000; Haveman and Rao, 1997), or across states to show how
regulatory environments differ (Guthrie and Roth, 1999a; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001; Wade et al., 1998). An important
line of research shows how US states are in economic competition; they are thus interested in promoting their own banks
as a way of supporting business within their borders. Campbell and Lindberg (1990), for example, maintain that laws and
regulations are a basis for competition among states to attract corporate headquarters and plant locations. Southern states,
for instance, offered more relaxed and, hence, favorable property rights to consolidate industries. And New Jersey and later
Delaware also passed permissive corporate laws to consolidate the headquarters of large corporations. Many legal scholars
have similarly described states’ regulation and facilitation of corporate entry to and exit from their local economies (Beb-
chuk, 1992; Romano, 1987, 1993; Steiner, 1975).
Both these prior sets of analyses—one focused on federal regulatory effects on ﬁrms and one on state-level facilitation of
business activity—are limited in that they typically only consider one side of the coin. But the relationships among federal
legislation, states, and ﬁrms is considerably more complex. Research on speciﬁc cases of how these institutional and orga-
nizational levels of analysis interact illuminates important facts about the ways in which organizations and states navigate
institutional change. We argue that federal and state regulatory processes are, in some cases, interdependent, and that states
have an important role in how ﬁrms interpret and respond to federal law. Other researchers have shown that federal law is
typically ambiguous and that ﬁrms are often interpreters and shapers of law (e.g. Dobbin et al., 1993; Dobbin and Sutton,
1998; Edelman, 1992). For instance, prior analyses suggest that ﬁrm response to law is a result of organizational trial and
error or of the adoption of ‘‘best practices’’ (Kalev et al., 2006). We suggest that US states play an active role in helping orga-
nizations address federal mandates. We use the term state activism to describe how states are active players in the creation,
maintenance, and creative appropriation of certain institutions that either consolidate or regulate businesses within their
borders. By helping organizations address federal ambiguity, states thus shape organizational activity and the structure of
industries.
Consolidation in the twentieth century US banking industry is a good setting to examine the intersection between orga-
nizations and their state and federal legal environments for a number of reasons. First, the banking industry is highly reg-
ulated at both levels. The inﬂuence of laws on the structure of banks and the banking industry is explored in a large literature
in both economics and sociology (e.g., Berger et al., 1995; Davis and Mizruchi, 1999; Marquis and Huang, 2009, 2010). Many
other US industries including transportation, communication, utilities, health care, and agriculture that, like banking, were
once highly regulated have been signiﬁcantly deregulated since the 1980s (Lounsbury et al., 1998).
Second, both types of regulators have been focused on the issue of bank consolidation. Regulatory limits on bank expan-
sion that grew out of an historical fear of concentrated capital and banking persisted for much of US history (Roe, 1994).
Communities resisted the consolidation of banks in their area, since larger banks were perceived as invaders beholden to
the economic interests of distant corporations, and were less responsive than smaller local banks to the needs of communi-
ties (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). Yet states’ economies and economic growth hinge on a large and vibrant banking sector
(Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2003). Economies of scale allow consolidated banks to provide a much wider array of services at
lower rates to local businesses; therefore, states bent on promoting local economic growth have an interest in promoting
bank consolidation within their borders.
Third, regulations of the banking industry, especially those at the federal level connecting acquisition activity and under-
served community lending, were ambiguous and complex, which gave state regulators some leverage to intervene in the
way banks interpreted and responded to those regulations. Our empirical analysis begins with a complex institutional his-
tory of a wave of bank regulation that began in the 1970s that we later quantitatively show has inﬂuenced the bank acqui-
sition wave of the 1990s. Corporate acquisitions have long held the interest of organizational scholars (Davis and Stout,
1992; Palmer et al., 1995; Stearns and Allan, 1996; Marquis and Huang, 2010). The banking case is unique, however, because
government approval of acquisitions is contingent on whether banks serve their local communities as mandated by the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act (CRA), which was passed in 1977 to compel banks to bring banking services and resources to low-
income communities. The CRA is a classic example of an ambiguous law in that speciﬁc criteria for compliance are not spec-
iﬁed, but there are many ways banks can get credit for ‘‘serving’’ low-income communities. Traditionally these have included
philanthropy, charitable activities, and access to services such as everyday consumer banking and personal and commercial
loans. While prior research on legal ambiguity has highlighted how such laws can provide opportunities for organizations,
we show how ambiguous CRA regulations provide a constraint on bank acquisition activities.
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regulators to assist banks in their acquisition activities. It was a small, experimental provision of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 called the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). Legislators did not realize at the time (because the LIHTC was
not originally intended for corporate use) that the LIHTC would by 1990 prove to be an extremely lucrative way to fulﬁll
CRA obligations because it also afforded banks a double tax break that was previously unheard of in corporate and individual
tax history (Guthrie, 2004; Guthrie and McQuarrie, 2005, 2006). Although the CRA and LIHTC are both federal laws, states
control how active the LIHTC market is within their borders. States make available to banks LIHTC opportunities, which help
them meet their CRA requirements in a cost-effective manner, and concurrently consolidate capital within their local econ-
omies. In the case of the CRA and LIHTC, regulatory action began at the federal level and state-level activism emerged, as an
unintended consequence, to help corporations navigate the regulatory environment. We show that because they are ambig-
uous, federal CRA judgments constrain bank acquisitions; however activist states are able to use the LIHTC to help banks
navigate the federal CRA requirements and as a result consolidate capital within their borders.
In the following section we review the literature in organizational theory on business-state relationships and on compe-
tition among states to attract business by creating a favorable economic environment. After that theoretical overview, we
discuss the particular case of banking regulation, showing empirically the interplay of federal and state actors governing,
and facilitating, bank acquisitions. The hypotheses proposed are informed by archival research of banking regulation over
the last 30 years, including the congressional record, government and academic studies, and press accounts, accompanied
by in-depth interviews with individuals working in this sector. We conclude with a discussion of our primary theoretical
point—because federal regulations of corporations are ambiguous, in situations when states interests are in-line with corpo-
rations, activist states can ﬁnd solutions that allow corporations to comply with the federal law in ways that may controvert
the intended federal regulatory mechanisms.2. Theory and hypotheses
Institutional theory, one of the most active areas of organizational research (e.g. see Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Powell and
DiMaggio, 1991), has shown that there are many ways that the state and law affect organizations. Investigators have as-
sessed how public policy inﬂuences organizational structures, strategies, and competitive conditions (e.g., Davis et al.,
1994; Dobbin and Dowd, 1997; Fligstein, 1990). Law within this framework has been categorized as having both coercive
and normative inﬂuences. For example, Fligstein (1990) showed how the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, which prohibited ver-
tical mergers, limited the options available to corporations and how one result was increased cross-industry acquisition
activity and the rise of conglomerates. On the normative side, a number of studies have shown how changes in the legal envi-
ronment in the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 disposed organizations in the 1960s and early 1970s to adopt different
organizational structures that signaled normative compliance with the emerging regulatory regime (Dobbin et al., 1993;
Edelman, 1990, 1992; Sutton et al., 1994).
A key conceptual innovation of recent work in this area distinguishes between the effects of strong versus weak states
(Jepperson and Meyer, 1991) and reveals how the effect of much US policy relies on organizational interpretation, and thus
there are typically multiple ways ﬁrms can meet the legal requirements. For example, in a study of the effectiveness of ﬁrm
anti-discrimination activities, Kalev et al. (2006) discussed how corporations’ afﬁrmative action and diversity policies de-
signed in response to the Civil Rights Act are typically a result of experiments with different types of ‘‘best practices.’’
This focus of ﬁrms searching for different alternative responses to federal regulations is also described by Dobbin and Sut-
ton (1998), and Edelman (1990, 1992). This body of work suggests that there are important state-level effects. For example,
in their study of ﬁrm responses to federal legislation, the Dobbin and Sutton team (Dobbin et al., 1993; Dobbin and Sutton,
1998; Sutton et al., 1994; Sutton and Dobbin, 1996) draw their sample of ﬁrms from three different states to test the hypoth-
esis that state-level legislative environments will cause ﬁrms to behave differently above and beyond the impact of federal
legislative change. They consistently ﬁnd that location in the State of California—with its comparatively liberal laws in sup-
port of workers’ rights (compared to Virginia and New Jersey)—has a signiﬁcant positive impact on the ﬁrm-level adoption of
a variety of labor-oriented practices.
Similarly, in a national sample of ﬁrms, Guthrie and Roth (1999b) show that the speciﬁc language of state-level statutory
law has an impact on what ﬁrms do within those states. Firms introduced new strategies of offering maternity leave beneﬁts
to circumvent the federal deﬁnition of gender neutrality in the workplace. State-level institutional environments provide a
framework for this institutional innovation, but it is the ﬁrms that were the agents in these models of action.
This research has focused mostly on organizational interpretations of the best way to meet regulatory conditions. In both
the Dobbin and Sutton and Guthrie and Roth studies, while states exist as separate institutional environments, the theoret-
ical view begins with ﬁrms that are creatively experimenting with practices to navigate the often ambiguous and (at times)
conﬂicting legislative mandates of both the federal and state systems.
However, another perspective is that state government may have an interest—economic or otherwise—in helping corpo-
rations circumvent the federally-regulated practice and therefore provide some of the tools to help corporations address
their federal responsibilities. A number of research traditions have studied how state-level policy typically takes the form
of facilitating as opposed to regulating economic activity. For much of US history, states engaged in ‘‘rivalistic state mercan-
tilism’’ (Scheiber, 1981) whereby state governments acted to protect their own industries and attract outside economic
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based industries. Campbell and Lindberg’s (1990) discussion of the importance of the US states as economic actors and their
role in the development of regionally distinct economies posits that laws were the basis of competition among states for
corporate headquarters and plant locations. We noted earlier southern states’ relaxation of property rights to attract indus-
tries and New Jersey’s and Delaware’s enactment of permissive corporate laws to attract corporate headquarters.
The facilitation of positive economic conditions for corporations has been widely explored in the legal literature on the
corporation. A number of scholars have studied states’ increasing deregulation of economic conditions to attract capital to
their local economies (Bebchuk, 1992; Romano, 1987, 1993; Steiner, 1975), a condition that has created the euphemistic
‘‘race to the bottom’’ in the area of corporate deregulation, where states end up lining up with corporate interests more than
with federal government or even community interests because they give greater primacy to state economic goals, which line
up more with corporate interests. The argument here is that states compete to create vibrant economies and establish within
their borders regulatory regimes favorable to corporations, thereby, according to this literature, facilitating as much as reg-
ulating corporate activity.1 Boeing’s decision to move its headquarters from Seattle to Chicago in 2001, for example, was heav-
ily inﬂuenced by the long-term tax package the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois were able to offer it relative to the less
lucrative incentives offered by the competing cities of Denver, Colorado and Dallas, Texas. Tax advantages are but one way in
which states can use the federal tax code to attract capital.
The case we describe below involves a part of the federal tax code that enables states to attract, retain and consolidate
banking capital in a way that is much more hidden from public view, because banking consolidation may be controversial.
We argue that states have more tools at their disposal than the simple tax abatements and the power to regulate or dereg-
ulate economic activity within their borders. States today are able, through the complex worlds of accounting, tax credits,
work placement systems, and variations in local political systems, to employ many different strategic approaches to attract-
ing and retaining capital, which may be less visible to certain opposing constituencies. Institutional change in the regulation
of the banking industry is driven by a complex interplay of federal, state, and corporate interests. This is a process that un-
folds over time, where corporations and states draw on an unanticipated application of a piece of federal legislation in an
attempt to ﬁnd a solution for dealing with an ambiguous and constraining federal regulation.
In the case and analyses we present here, an obscure piece of federal legislation (the LIHTC) that few in Congress expected
would amount to much (much less offer any beneﬁts for corporations) became an opportunity for a double tax break for the
corporate sector and the catalyst for a dramatic increase in activity surrounding the development of low-income housing
(Guthrie, 2004; Guthrie and McQuarrie, 2005, 2006). It also created an opportunity for states to promote consolidation
and retain capital within their jurisdictions by promoting the use of this credit as a way to deal with the federal regulatory
pressures of the CRA. Thus, as described above, we argue that the developments in the area of low-income housing had
important consequences for banks in terms of rethinking their strategies for: (1) ﬁnding solutions for dealing with the reg-
ulatory pressures of the CRA that could hinder their acquisition activity and (2) seeking out the business opportunities pre-
sented by the low-income housing development market. This trend led, in turn, to states taking an activist approach to
developing the market for low-income housing by promoting the LIHTC, which would provide banks with economic oppor-
tunities as well by bolstering their CRA ratings and shifting some of their cost of CRA compliance to the federal government.2.1. State policy and US bank expansion
Throughout US history, the banking industry has been the focus of public fear of expansion and the associated concen-
tration of capital (Roe, 1994) with the result that federal and state governments have taken a strong role in regulating bank
growth and geographic spread (Marquis and Huang, 2009, 2010). Although the general public still did not approve of con-
solidated capital, as the twentieth century progressed it became clear that having larger banks might be in the states’ eco-
nomic interests because they could provide capital to help ﬁnance growth in other areas (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2003).
This led to tension in states’ regulation of banking institutions. Owing to strong public support for a geographically limited
banking industry, restrictive banking laws were popular in many states. But, because of banks importance to the state econ-
omy, as well as their informal power (Mizruchi, 1992; Davis and Mizruchi, 1999), states also had an incentive to devise
means to allow banks to circumvent these restrictions to facilitate their expansion. Economies of scale allow larger banks
to provide a much wider array of services at lower rates; therefore, states bent on promoting local economic growth may
be invested in promoting bank consolidation within their borders.
Debate and legislative change around the control and growth of banks, particularly with respect to their ability to estab-
lish ofﬁces across state lines, persisted throughout the 1980s. By the late 1980s, a majority of US states permitted out-of-
state banks to operate within their borders. The federal government, taking an activist position and aiming for a consolidated
US banking sector able to compete globally, essentially ended state restrictions on bank expansion with the passage in 1994
of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007).
As we explain below, however, there remained throughout this period, federal regulatory barriers to bank expansion aris-
ing from the Community Reinvestment Act. But as we also show, the ambiguous nature of this regulation provided latitude1 Local tax laws are an obvious example of this dynamic: while US corporations are all subject to the same federal tax rates, state-level corporate tax rates
vary widely, ranging from 0% to 9.99%, one of the many ways in which states attract corporations to their local economies.
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tions a way around this restriction in order to effectively maintain sources of capital within their borders and continue the
century-long trend of bank consolidation. Thus, our contention is that to understand the inﬂuence of ambiguous regulations
designed for social purposes, it is incomplete to just look at actors’ responses, but one must consider the interests behind
other institutional forces that push or pull organizations toward different solutions.
2.2. Federal regulation of community reinvestment
By the early 1970s, many US cities were in crisis (e.g., Massey and Denton, 1992; Venkatesh, 2000; Wilson, 1987) and
there was growing recognition that banks were partially to blame. Housing markets were signiﬁcantly shaped by unfair
lending practices, and ‘‘redlining’’ by banks became one of the hottest issues of the time as community activists began to
exert pressure on legislators.2 To hold banks and other lending agencies accountable in the areas of mortgages and housing
development, the US Congress passed the Fair Housing Act in 1968, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1974, the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975, and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977. The HMDA and CRA are often viewed
as going hand-in-hand, as the former forces banks to report their lending practices and the latter articulates the standards by
which banks are to manage their lending. These institutional changes are considered to be among the most important federal
regulations on banking since the 1930s.3
The CRA stipulates that lenders (1) serve the local communities in which they do business, and (2) serve those commu-
nities in their entirety including low- and middle-income constituencies (Hossain, 2004). More speciﬁcally, lending institu-
tions should provide fair access to credit and deposit services (e.g., ensure that local communities have access to local
branches or automatic teller machines), afford citizens access to a public CRA record, and be involved in the local commu-
nities they are required to serve. There are a number of different federal agencies that assess bank compliance with the CRA,
including the Federal Reserve Board, the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Ofﬁce
of Thrift Supervision. Each agency has its own separate CRA staff that examines the banks over which it has jurisdiction
depending on each banks’ charter. Instead of speciﬁc criteria for meeting community needs such as percentages of loans
to low income consumers, or establishing ofﬁces in low income areas, CRA performance is simply rated by the examiners
on a scale of 1–4 (1 = outstanding, 2 = satisfactory, 3 = needs to improve, 4 = substantial noncompliance), and there are many
ways including philanthropy and other activities that banks can engage in to achieve a satisfactory CRA rating. The CRA rat-
ings are also focused on the relationship between banking establishments and their locales and so large multi-establishment
banks like Bank of America or Citigroup, which have been involved in many mergers and serve many local markets, are not
assessed an overall CRA rating. Rather, each establishment-level bank is rated with regard to its CRA practices.4
Adherence to CRA requirements is one of the main axes upon which banks seeking to acquire other banks are assessed.
And banks vary widely on how they achieve high ratings in this realm. Most of the commentary in the summaries of bank
acquisition approvals reported each quarter in the Federal Reserve Bulletin concerns how merging banks have met CRA obli-
gations and the potential impact of the merged institution on future CRA activities. Part of the acquisition approval process is
a public comment period in the course of which citizens, legislators, and other interested parties can use the public CRA data
to inﬂuence the regulators´ approval decision. For example, during the acquisition of First Interstate Bank by Wells Fargo
Bank, ‘‘(m)ore than 600 commenters (on the banks CRA performance) either opposed the proposal, requested that the Board
approve the merger subject to conditions suggested by the commenter, or expressed concerns about the CRA performance
record of Wells Fargo or First Interstate’’ (Federal Reserve, 1996, p. 82) suggesting that the intense scrutiny of CRA behavior is
a potential constraint on bank acquisitions.
In another example, in 1989, the Federal Reserve Board denied an application from Continental Bank Corporation and
Continental Illinois Bancorp, Inc. to acquire all of the voting shares of Grand Canyon State Bank in Scottsdale, Arizona, based
on Continental’s neglect of CRA (McKinley, 1994). Further, in a high proﬁle case, the Federal Reserve Board also denied Shaw-
mut National Corporation’s application in 1993 to acquire New Dartmouth Bank. It later reversed its decision after Shawmut
agreed to settle the case for $1 million to compensate minorities for its poor CRA performance, and after it took measures to
improve such performance in the future (McKinley, 1994). As these cases show, there is signiﬁcant Federal scrutiny, and for
banks with poor CRA performance the merger application process is likely to be cumbersome and embarrassing. Such banks2 ‘‘Redlining’’ is the practice whereby lenders assess speciﬁc communities as high risk areas—historically denoted (ﬁguratively, and, in some cases, literally)
by drawing red lines around them—based on race and ethnicity.
3 Although many scholars view the CRA as largely responsible for turning America’s urban crisis around (e.g., Macey and Miller, 1993; Marsico, 2005), we
believe this to be a misreading of the legislative history and immediate impact of the CRA. Indeed, the effect of the CRA in the 1970s and early 1980s was
minimal. Again, because the law did not spell out exactly how banks should serve their communities, banks compliance took multiple forms, and typically
became involved in low-income communities through grants and charitable donations to local nonproﬁt organizations (i.e. they changed their behavior enough
to get CRA credit), but the legislation did nothing to change the logic of their lending practices (Guthrie and McQuarrie, 2005, 2006). This is a signiﬁcant point,
because the CRA was speciﬁcally intended to inﬂuence the logic of the way banks conducted business. But because they could typically score sufﬁciently high
CRA ratings by inﬂuencing communities through philanthropic action, and because urban areas were still considered high risk, banks for the most part did not
change their lending practices with respect to those areas.
4 By establishment, we mean each separate banking company that is registered with the government as a separate company (i.e. a separately chartered bank)
and is therefore given a CRA rating. Larger banks, such as Bank of America or Citigroup are holding companies that are composed of many banking
establishments. For example, within Bank of America during the period of our study are the separate legal establishments of Bank of America California, and
Bank of America North Carolina.
C. Marquis et al. / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 130–145 135experience signiﬁcant delay and expensive litigation costs as a result of the extended public comment period they go
through. For those reasons, those banks are less likely to attempt acquiring other banks, and less likely to receive regulatory
clearance if they initiate the process.
Thus, we hypothesize that because of this constraint, banks with low CRA ratings are less likely to acquire other ﬁrms.
Hypothesis 1a. Banks with a low CRA rating will be less likely to acquire other banks.
But the relationship between CRA rating and acquisitions is more complex than it may appear on the surface because of
the ambiguity associated with the CRA criteria and examination process. This ambiguity creates a dynamic that is very much
in line with the body of institutional research that suggests that regulations are often ambiguous and that ﬁrms experiment
with different practices to navigate the institutional environment (Edelman, 1990, 1992). As noted, the rating process is
somewhat subjective in that a numerical value is assigned by an examiner as opposed to having concrete thresholds for cer-
tain activities. John LaWare, a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governor’s commented that ‘‘CRA’s inherent vague-
ness (is). . . frustrating at times for banks,’’ (Fettig, 1993) but that the vagueness is somewhat necessary because of the unique
situations of each bank, and the communities they are in. Further, the frequency of CRA ratings by regulators is variable, and
depends on bank size and prior CRA history. Examinations occur annually for large banks and banks with poor prior ratings,
but only every 5 years for smaller banks and banks with outstanding prior ratings. Thus, considerable time might have
elapsed since a potential acquisition target bank’s last rating which creates even further uncertainty for acquisition minded
bankers.
Unlike the other research on legal ambiguity (e.g. Edelman, 1992; Dobbin and Sutton, 1998) that has focused on how
ﬁrms take advantage of ambiguous laws, we argue that the uncertainty created by this ambiguity would serve as a constraint
on the acquisition behavior of banks with high CRA ratings. These banks would be protective of their ratings and fearful of
the risk and uncertainty associated with acquiring other banks. Thus, an unintended effect of this social provision is that it is
paralyzing to the well-performing banks that should beneﬁt from their exemplary behavior. Beyond the ability to acquire
other banks, there are many beneﬁts to a high CRA rating. First, there is signiﬁcant public relations value in being perceived
as serving the community well. Commercial banking is a business that is closely tied to local communities and community
identity (Marquis et al., 2007; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007), and so having an image of being an upstanding citizen is an
asset for a bank. Thus, banks typically publicize positive CRA ratings in press releases (e.g. see US Bank, 2005: ‘‘US Bank Re-
ceives ‘Outstanding’ CRA Rating for Its Efforts in Greater Cincinnati’’). The disciplining value of public perception of bank’s
community performance is actually the main reason why regulators made these ratings publicly available starting in
1990 (Fettig, 1993). There is also evidence that positive perceptions of consumers translate into ﬁnancial performance for
banks. For example, Simpson and Kohers (2002) found that there is a positive relationship between CRA performance and
the ﬁnancial performance of banks. And Johnson and Sarkar (1996) found that higher levels of CRA protests during acquisi-
tion hearings led to declines in banks’ stock prices. CRA ratings are also used by socially responsible investment rating ﬁrms
such as KLD Research and Analytics to determine if certain ﬁrms should be part of social investment funds. Because of the
importance of a high rating to well performing banks and ambiguity and uncertainty associated with CRA ratings and the
rating process, we believe that ﬁrms with a high CRA rating will also be less likely to acquire other ﬁrms.
Hypothesis 1b. Banks with a high CRA rating will be less likely to acquire other banks.
Thus, if the CRA ratings constrain the acquisition behavior of both the higher and lower performing banks, the former
because of the risks associated with the uncertainty of target banks’ true community focus, and the later because they would
be unable to pass federal muster; this suggests that banks with a moderate CRA rating would be the ones more likely to ac-
quire other banks. These ﬁrms would be able to pass the federal review of their community activities, but their ratings would
not be so high as to make them fearful of jeopardizing their rating and thus shun acquisition opportunities. In a sense, be-
cause their risk is lower, the ambiguity surrounding a target’s CRA rating matters less for these organizations.
Hypothesis 1c. Banks with a moderate CRA rating will be more likely to acquire other banks.
The hypotheses above suggest the federal enforcement of CRA activities has both intended and unintended consequences.
While low performing CRA banks’ acquisition activities are constrained, because of the ambiguity of the system, so are those
of the high performing banks.
2.3. How and why states help banks meet federal CRA requirements
We argue that this ambiguity not only serves as a constraint; consistent with the organizational theory discussed above,
this ambiguity also creates an opportunity for interested actors. In this case, not only banks but states also have an interest in
aiding consolidation within their borders because larger and more powerful banks are believed to serve the economic inter-
ests of the states better. Additionally, states are also interested in preventing a social regulatory provision putting a con-
straint on the best performing socially-oriented banks.
The legislation that would enable states to help banks address their federal CRA ratings, and reduce acquisition-related
uncertainty, was passed in 1986 as part of a major overhaul of the federal tax code. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 included a
small provision that would have major implications for the development of low-income housing, while producing a windfall
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close the ‘‘passive loss’’ loophole – established in the Economic Recovery Act (ERA) of 1981 – that had become an extremely
lucrative tax shelter for wealthy individuals. Congress decided to close the passive loss loophole but in its place leave a tax
credit that would give individuals incentives to invest in low-income real estate without the incentive of driving property
values down (which was central to the passive loss provision of ERA 1981).
An unintended consequence of the LIHTC was that, although the tax break was intended for individuals, it could be
bought by corporations, which still had access to passive loss depreciation write-offs for corporate assets. Low-income hous-
ing could thus be counted as a corporate asset, which meant that corporations could receive both the tax credits and a tax
write off against the future depreciation of low-income property.5
As noted earlier, states control the level of activity in the market for tax credits within their borders, and there is evidence
that this is one of the hidden mechanisms states use to help banks address CRA concerns and thereby consolidate and retain
capital. Although the LIHTC is a credit against federal taxes, use of the credits plays out at the state level in the form of their
distribution by state housing agencies to developers based on a point system that reﬂects the priorities of the state govern-
ment. The amount of credits to which a state has access depends on the population; the IRS allocates tax credits to the states
at a rate of $1.80 per person. Yet, beneﬁts to both states and banks notwithstanding, states vary considerably in how actively
they pursue the creation of a LIHTC sector. For example, the top states in LIHTC production per capita (Delaware, Louisiana,
Missouri, and Texas) facilitated the production of three times as many units as the bottom producers (Nebraska, Connecticut,
Alabama, and New Hampshire).
More importantly, although the LIHTC is a federal provision, individual states approached this institutional opportunity in
different ways. There are no federal guidelines for how to handle the distribution of the units or how to facilitate the devel-
opment of the complex public–private partnerships that these LIHTC deals require. While in most states, the state housing
and community affairs department handles the allocation of LIHTCs, how actively they work with corporations, banks,
municipalities, and neighborhood organizations varies considerably across states. For example, in the state of Ohio, the Ohio
Department of Development works very closely with local governments (like the City of Cleveland), local nonproﬁt organi-
zations, local corporations, and developers to cultivate the types of deals that are most attractive to each of these players. The
ODD selects and approves the development deals that will be allocated LIHTC, but it is the facilitating role that the state
agency plays that is so important in promoting the use of LIHTCs within the state. While the ODD serves many functions,
the Community Action Agency within the ODD is a large ofﬁce with many employees devoted solely to facilitating LIHTC
development deals. In contrast, the Washington State Department of Community and Economic Development is focused
on many different aspects of community development, devoting only a small amount of staff and time to facilitating LIHTC
deals (Guthrie and McQuarrie, 2007).
In terms of the credits themselves, LIHTCs grant corporations and banks a dollar-for-dollar credit against tax liability as
well as a ‘‘passive-loss’’ write-off against the future book-value depreciation of low-income property. Tax credits, much rarer
and more lucrative than standard tax deductions, are subtracted directly from the amount of tax a corporation owes. For
example, a bank that owes $100,000 in taxes after taking all the typical corporate deductions from earnings, but also holds
$100,000 in LITHCs, has a tax liability for the year of $0. Moreover, because the LIHTCs represent a physical asset, the bank is
also able to deduct depreciation expenses from its income, yielding an additional ﬁnancial beneﬁt. In other words, through
the LIHTC, corporations and banks get an exceedingly beneﬁcial tax deal and also become hidden ‘‘investors’’ in low-income
housing. Since 1986, the LIHTC has become the primary driver behind the ﬂow of resources into inner-city housing project
development, accounting for more than ﬁve billion dollars in corporate investment (Guthrie and McQuarrie, 2005).
How is all this related to banks and their CRA responsibilities? The ﬁnancial beneﬁts attached to buying the credits make
participation in the LIHTC program a relatively simple calculus for corporations, and these same double-dip beneﬁts
(credit + passive loss write-off) make the program appealing to banks.6 But there is another important beneﬁt for banks. The
purchase of LIHTCs has become yet another way in which banks can get credit for servicing underserved communities and thus
improve their CRA ratings without changing their lending practices (i.e., buying credits but not actually lending or issuing mort-
gages). Suggesting that the LIHTC has become legitimized as a way to achieve CRA credit, recent articles in Federal Reserve pub-
lications that describe how banks can participate in LIHTCs in a way that maximizes their CRA credit conclude that ‘‘the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit has proven to be an excellent investment for banks, both from a CRA and ﬁnancial perspective’’ (Such,
2002, p. 5). LIHTCs are a signiﬁcantly better deal than community-focused philanthropic donations (the primary way banks
boosted CRA ratings in the late 1970s and 1980s) that only reduce taxable income by the amount of the philanthropic gift.5 This institutional innovation of using LIHTCs for corporations was ﬁrst realized in 1986 by Joe Hagan of the Ohio State Housing Finance Agency and Jim
Rouse of the Enterprise Foundation, both of whom would become key players in the institutionalization of this practice on a national scale (Guthrie and
McQuarrie, 2005). Today, the use of LIHTCs by corporations and banks entails a complex accounting procedure that requires a variety of organizations working
together to realize the double tax break. Instead of paying taxes, corporations and banks use the would-be tax dollars to purchase tax credits from a syndicator
such as the National Equity Fund (NEF) or Enterprise Social Investment Corporation (ESIC), intermediary organizations that emerged in the 1980s to manage
book-value tax credits they receive from the state and sell to corporations. NEF and ESIC were the earliest models of these organizations; today, most large
banks provide similar services in-house.
6 There are additional beneﬁts to the LIHTC beyond the double tax break. Syndicators such as NEF often transfer the credits to corporations at a discount
amounting to as much as 20% of the credits’ face value, enabling a corporation to buy, for example, $1,000,000 worth of credits for only $800,000. Moreover, the
ﬂow of resources across the system is highly liquid because LIHTCs can be resold on the secondary market as mortgage-backed securities. Fannie Mae has
become the largest holder of LIHTCs in the country through this secondary market.
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tax accounting, it is acknowledged in merger approval processes. For example, the Federal Reserve Board legal order that
granted ﬁnal approval for Charlotte, NC-based Bank of America’s acquisition of Boston’s Fleet Bank noted a number of LIHTC
projects that were used to satisfy the CRA ‘‘investment test’’ (Federal Reserve, 2004). Nor was this an isolated instance. Bank
of America, one of the nation’s largest investors in the LIHTC market in recent years, engages in LIHTC activity in areas where
it has acquisition-related CRA obligations (Affordable Housing, 2009). Bank of America has grown from a small North Car-
olina bank into the second largest bank in the United States, mainly through acquisitions made in the 1990s. It also owns
the oldest bank-owned community development corporation in the country (founded in 1977). In 1999, Bank of America
pledged $750 billion over a 10-year period to community development initiatives (Bank of America, 2004), the vast majority
in low-income urban areas, the very areas banks had systematically disregarded in the 1970s. (The original pledge was $350
billion over a 10-year period beginning in 1999; the ﬁgure was expanded to $750 billion in 2004.) Fig. 1 shows the greater
part of these resources, nearly 80% or more than $86 billion in the ﬁrst 5 years, to have gone to affordable housing.
Although largely hidden from public view, LIHTCs are among the most attractive tax mechanisms available to banks, pro-
viding a lucrative, low-risk way of serving low-income communities and thus collecting CRA credit while simultaneously
facilitating the further consolidation of the US banking industry. In states with more active LIHTC regimes, there is less
CRA uncertainty and risk to banks when acquiring because of the additional mechanism to fulﬁll CRA obligations. Thus,
although states might create a market for them primarily to build low-income housing, LIHTCs also serve to retain and con-
solidate capital inasmuch as banks seeking acquisition opportunities can solve the problem of ﬁnding a viable acquisition
target and gaining CRA credit (given a healthy market for LIHTCs) and at the same time secure lucrative tax breaks. In other
words, states active in creating a market for LIHTCs are also creating incentives for banks to pursue acquisitions within their
borders.
Hypothesis 2a. As state activism in the creation of a market for LIHTCs increases, so should the likelihood of banks’
acquisitions within that state also increase.
If this assessment is correct, the obverse should also be true: banks headquartered in states weak in the creation of LIHTC
markets should be more likely to seek acquisition targets outside of those states.
Hypothesis 2b. As state activism in the creation of a market for LIHTCs decreases, banks headquartered within that state will
seek acquisitions outside of the state.3. Data and methods
We test our predictions on all commercial banks in the 48 contiguous United States that received a CRA rating between
1990 and 2000.7 The resulting database has 91,905 bank-year observations across the approximately 13,000 banks that existed
during this period. CRA performance data became publicly available in 1990, and we assembled annual data on CRA perfor-
mance from 1990 until 2000 from the CRA rating database of the Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) (http://
www.fﬁec.gov/cracf/crarating/Rtg_spec.cfm). This year is an appropriate starting point because, although originally passed in
1986, the LIHTC was renewed and given semi-permanent status in 1989. The ﬁrst year of operation under this semi-permanent
status was 1990. The CRA ratings we use are for each bank that had a separate charter; our deﬁnition of a bank as a separately
chartered institution is consistent with prior work in economics that studies bank acquisitions (Rhoades, 2000; Wheelock and
Wilson, 2001). Because there frequently is more than one separately chartered bank within a single bank holding company,
other studies of bank mergers have grouped all chartered banks in the same holding company within each state (Stiroh and
Strahan, 2003). We are however constrained by the fact that CRA ratings are given to each separately chartered entity. As a
check however, we ran models without the CRA variable and grouped all organizations within each holding company and ob-
tained consistent results for our other hypothesized variables (results available by request).
We use for our dependent variable counts of the total numbers of in-state acquisitions and out-of-state acquisitions pursued
by that bank during a given year. These data are from both the Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company Merger dat-
abases maintained by the Chicago Federal Reserve (http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commer-
cial_bank_data.cfm). Our two primary independent variables are a bank’s CRA rating and state-level low income housing
development credits issued by a state. We ran models with three different dummy variables to show the varying effects
of different CRA levels. High CRA rating was assigned to ﬁrms with a CRA rating of 1 (outstanding); moderate CRA rating to
indicate CRA rating of 2 (satisfactory); and low CRA rating ﬁrms with ratings of 3 or 4 (needs to improve and substantial non-
compliance). We gauge state activism in the area of low-income housing development in terms of the total number of LIHTC
credits a state authorized in each year. We collected the LIHTC data from the US Bureau of Census and The Danter Company, a
private market feasibility company for the real estate industry (www.danter.com). We use the natural log transformation of
this variable to reduce the skewed effect of outliers on the models.7 All banks that are larger than 250 million in assets or part of a bank holding company that has cumulatively over 250 million in assets are required to
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Fig. 1. Bank of America’s lending and investment in community economic development, 1999–2004.
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institutional environment that may make acquisitions more or less likely. The two most important bank characteristics relat-
ing to acquisitions are bank performance and bank size (Rhoades, 2000; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). We operationalized per-
formance as return on equity (ROE) which is the ratio of income to equity and bank size as each bank’s total assets. We also
included a variable to indicate if a bank’s headquarters was in an urban area (MSA), as prior research has shown urban areas
to be more fruitful acquisition markets (Pillof, 2004), and further, urban banks may be less community-oriented, which
would inﬂuence their CRA focus. These variables are from the Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company databases main-
tained by the Chicago Federal Reserve and the ﬁnancial variables are lagged 1 year. To account for state-level economic con-
ditions that might inﬂuence acquisition activity, we included for each state per capita income, total population8 (logged
because of extreme values), percentage of the population that lived in urbanized areas, number of banks and average size of banks
(logged because of extreme values). These variables were obtained from the US Census and banking databases mentioned above.
We also created a dummy variable if the year was after 1994 to control for effects of themerger wave that occurred from 1994 to
2000 (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). Other aspects of state-level legal environments may also inﬂuence acquisitions, so we
included variables for whether a state permits interstate banking and has a unit banking law (which limits banks to one location).
The interstate banking law variable was included only in models that predicted in-state acquisitions (because if banki is acquir-
ing an out-of-state bank in statej, statej, by deﬁnition, allows interstate banking). These data on state laws were assembled from
Conference of State Bank Supervisors biannual publication A Proﬁle of State-Chartered Banking.
Our dependent variables are counts of acquisitions by each bank in a given year and we considered two primary ways of
analyzing these data. The traditional method, Poisson regression, is appropriate when the mean and variance of the depen-
dent variable are similar. But when the variance is greater than the mean (the case here) the data are considered over-dis-
persed and negative binomial regression is the most appropriate speciﬁcation. A further issue with these data is that not all
observations are independent as we have multiple observations for many banks in the study period. To correct for this, we
use a random effects panel model that accounts for situations in which there are multiple observations per ﬁrm over time
(xtnbreg command in STATA). The general model we use to analyze the associations among these variables takes the form of
a random effects model for the determinants of bank acquisitions by bank i within and outside of the state in which a given
bank, i, is located that takes the form of:8 Obs
throughYijt ¼ aþ b1ðCRAÞit þ b2ðLIHTCÞjt þ cZit þ di þ kt þ eit ;where Yijt represents the number of acquisitions for bank i in state j at time t, a is an intercept, (CRA)it is a dummy variable
indicating the CRA rating of bank i at time t, (LIHTC)jt represents the LITHC environment of state j at time t. b1 represents the
effect of a bank’s CRA rating on the outcome variables and b2 represents the effect of states’ LIHTC promotion on the outcome
variables, Zit is a vector of measurable bank-level variables for bank i at time t, c is a vector of regression coefﬁcients corre-
sponding to the variables in vector Z, di represents random effects of bank-level heterogeneity, kt represents unobserved
time-based heterogeneity (year effects), and eit is a time-varying error term. Congruent with the assumptions of random ef-
fects models, we assume that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with Zi and ei (Hausman, 1978). These models are esti-
mated in a GLS framework using the negative binomial regression program in Stata 9. Given the possibility of unobserved
ﬁrm-level determinants of these outcomes, it could be argued that a ﬁxed effects model would be more appropriate, but be-
cause some organizations are in the dataset for only 1 year it is not possible to use ﬁxed effects as there would be no variance
in the panel for these cases.erving a high correlation between state population and LIHTC, we ran the existing models without state population and obtained consistent results
out and even stronger results for the LIHTC variable. To be conservative, we report models that include state population as a control.
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key variables was under 3, and no single variable was above 10, which is the standard cutoff signaling a multicollinearity
problem.4. Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. The correlations between state LIHTC activity and CRA ratings
are low: .068 for high rating banks, and .048 and .045 for moderate and low CRA ratings, respectively. Tables 2 and 3 pres-
ent the regression models for bank acquisitions within state of headquarters and outside state of headquarters, respectively.
The latter tables are similar in format. Model I has all control variables. Model II adds the LIHTC variable, models III and IV
present the low CRA analyses, with and without the LIHTC variable, models V and VI present the high CRA analyses and mod-
els VII and VIII the moderate CRA analyses. In addition, while we base our interpretations on the above noted models, for
informational purposes, we added model VIII to test the effects of moderate and low CRA ratings relative to high CRA ratings
(the referent dummy variable).
Hypothesis 1a considered how low CRA banks would be less likely to acquire others and results are mixed in support of
this hypothesis. While it does appear that low CRA ﬁrms are constrained in making within-state acquisitions (Model III of
Table 2), this variable, while negative is not statistically signiﬁcant for outside state acquisitions. Turning to the high CRA
rated banks, results strongly support our contention in Hypothesis 1b that these ﬁrms are constrained by their high rating
and are therefore less likely to acquire other ﬁrms. In both the within state and outside state analyses, this variable is
strongly signiﬁcant in the negative direction. The 0.125 coefﬁcient in the within state analyses can be interpreted as fol-
lows: banks with high CRA ratings are 12% less likely than other ﬁrms to make acquisitions within their focal state (1  exp
(0.125) = 0.12). This effect is even more pronounced for outside-state acquisitions as high CRA ﬁrms are 46% less likely than
other banks to make acquisitions across state lines (1  exp(0.617) = 0.46). In assessing Hypothesis 1c, that banks with
moderate CRA ratings are more likely to acquire other banks, note in both Tables 2 and 3 that the variable that captures mod-
erate CRA rating is strongly signiﬁcant, supporting our hypotheses and further supporting our case that CRA rating serves as
a constraint on acquisitions. These CRA results support our hypotheses that both high and low rated banks would be con-
strained in their acquisitions.
In Model VIII of both Tables 2 and 3 we present models for informational purposes where we include the variables for
both moderate and low CRA rating, thus, high CRA rating is the reference group. As the results show, banks with moderate
CRA ratings perform higher levels of acquisitions than banks with high CRA ratings, both within and out-of-state, as we
hypothesized. However, while Table 2 shows that banks with low CRA ratings are signiﬁcantly less likely (40% = 1  exp
(0.507) = 0.40) to perform in-state acquisitions than banks with high CRA ratings, the corresponding model in Table 3
shows that the same is not true of out-of-state acquisitions. Here the effect is not signiﬁcant. In the discussion, we discuss
how this difference in effects across types of acquisitions of low versus high CRA rate banks may be a result of different types
of uncertainty and risk that high and low CRA rated banks face when contemplating within state and out of state
acquisitions.
Hypothesis 2a, which predicts that a state’s level of activism in creating an LIHTC market increases the likelihood of a
bank acquisition within the state, is strongly supported by the results reported in Table 2. Even controlling for many other
organizational and state-level controls, the more active a state is in LIHTCs, the more likely its banks are to acquire other
banks within the state. The 0.185 coefﬁcient of the LIHTC variable on count of within state acquisitions can be interpreted
as follows: for every one unit change in the natural log of a state’s LIHTC spending, the likelihood of acquiring a bank in the
same state increases by 20% (exp (0.185) = 1.20). This supports our contention that states with activist LIHTC programs that
help their banks satisfy CRA requirements are more likely to be effective at retaining capital. Hypothesis 2b, which predicts
that banks in states that do not actively pursue a market for LIHTCs are more likely to pursue bank acquisitions outside of
those states, is strongly supported by the results reported in Table 3. These results essentially mirror those reported in Ta-
ble 2, suggesting a negative relationship between LIHTC and out-of-state acquisitions. The 0.409 coefﬁcient of the LIHTC
variable on count of acquisitions outside of the state can be interpreted as follows: for every one unit decrease in the natural
log of a state’s LIHTC spending, the likelihood of acquiring a bank out of the state increases by 34% (1  exp (0.409) = 0.34).
This suggests that, even controlling for many other organizational and state-level variables, the less active a state is in
LIHTCs, the more likely its banks look elsewhere for acquisitions.
Results of some control variables in the tables are also quite interesting. First, contrary to some economic research (Stiroh
and Strahan, 2003), it appears that bank size inﬂuences to a much greater degree than bank performance which banks
acquire other banks. As would be expected based on prior analyses of changes following deregulation in the ﬁnancial
services industry (Haveman, 1993), larger banks are more likely to acquire both in-state and out-of-state ﬁrms. Bank
performance (ROE), on the other hand, is negatively associated with acquisition activity. This, however, may simply indicate
a causal relationship in the opposite direction. Banks consolidating may have initially lower performance in terms of ROE.
(Those banks may end up on average with proportionally more equity in the denominator than additional income in the
numerator.)
States with interstate banking laws tend to see fewer in-state mergers, as banks in those states presumably have more
opportunities available to them out of state. Further, the merger wave variable that captured the period following federal
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Interstate acquisitions 0.005 0.233
2 Instate acquisitions 0.033 0.262 0.018
3 High CRA rating 0.188 0.391 0.013 0.023
4 Moderate CRA rating 0.785 0.411 0.011 0.017 0.921
5 Low CRA rating 0.026 0.161 0.003 0.012 0.080 0.315
6 LIHTC credits 7.480 0.957 0.003 0.027 0.068 0.048 0.045
7 ROE 0.942 2.705 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.013 0.023 0.010
8 Total assets 11.22 1.296 0.080 0.204 0.175 0.150 0.043 0.075 0.015
9 HQ in MSA 0.452 0.498 0.017 0.065 0.009 0.021 0.075 0.211 0.025 0.376
10 Interstate banking law 0.990 0.099 0.002 0.000 0.022 0.015 0.014 0.102 0.006 0.080 0.056
11 Unit banking law 0.003 0.051 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.002 0.037 0.043 0.008 0.035 0.001 0.005
12 Per capita income 26,608 3512 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.016 0.003 0.131 0.007 0.222 0.277 0.091 0.018
13 State population 15.54 0.889 0.001 0.024 0.052 0.036 0.035 0.863 0.005 0.172 0.295 0.129 0.018 0.404
14 Urban Population (%) 0.722 0.121 0.009 0.019 0.050 0.025 0.059 0.562 0.011 0.150 0.354 0.078 0.014 0.677 0.715
15 State banking assets 12.56 0.980 0.025 0.029 0.003 0.008 0.027 0.323 0.007 0.408 0.363 0.144 0.048 0.531 0.511 0.464
16 Numb. banks in state 671.5 442.3 0.014 0.010 0.049 0.041 0.016 0.538 0.002 0.184 0.018 0.010 0.005 0.125 0.508 0.406 0.234














Random effects negative binomial models of banks acquiring within state of headquarters (DV: count of acquisitions).
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VII Model VIII
Low CRA rating (0/1) 0.62899** 0.62241** 0.5073**
(3.36) (3.32) (2.63)
High CRA rating (0/1) 0.1245* 0.12718*
(2.28) (2.33)
Moderate CRA rating (0/1) 0.17801** 0.17984** 0. 13883*
(3.38) (3.41) (2.54)
Ln (State Low Income
Housing Tax Credit)
0.18486** 0.18214** 0.18692** 0.18688** 0.18427*,**
(3.23) (3.19) (3.27) (3.27) (057)
ROE 0.02943** 0.02934** 0.02933** 0.0292** 0.02929** 0.0292** 0.0292** 0.0291** 0.0291**
(2.87) (2.84) (2.84) (2.81) (2.86) (2.83) (2.85) (2.82) (3.23)
Ln (total assets) 0.96549** 0.96534** 0.9622** 0.9621** 0.97333** 0.97339** 0.97551** 0.97552** 0.9707⁄⁄⁄
(41.42) (41.34) (41.24) (41.17) (41.28) (41.21) (41.46) (41.39) (41.08)
HQ in MSA (0/1) 0.14403* 0.14458* 0.13099* 0.13173* 0.14872* 0.14946* 0.14618* 0.1469* 0.1365*
(2.24) (2.25) (2.04) (2.05) (2.31) (2.33) (2.28) (2.29) (2.12)
State unit banking law
(0/1)
0.12699 0.2691 0.14406 0.28404 0.10107 0.24443 0.09548 0.23918 0.23918
(0.33) (0.69) (0.37) (0.73) (0.26) (0.63) (0.25) (0.62) (0.62)
State interstate banking law
(0/1)
0.59023** 0.6226** 0.59713** 0.62918** 0.57875** 0.61158** 0.57613** 0.60926** 0.6017**
(2.90) (3.05) (2.93) (3.08) (2.84) (2.99) (2.82) (2.98) (3.02)
State per capita income
(2001 $s)
0.00007** 0.00005** 0.00007** 0.00005** 0.00007** 0.00005** 0.00007** 0.00005** 0.00005**
(5.72) (4.25) (5.75) (4.30) (5.81) (4.32) (5.85) (4.36) (4.37)
Ln (total state population) 0.10176+ 0.06593 0.09953+ 0.06568 0.09813+ 0.07154 0.09579+ 0.07385 0.0725
(1.76) (0.85) (1.72) (0.85) (1.70) (0.92) (1.66) (0.95) (0.92)
Percent state population in
urban areas
2.116** 1.98237** 2.14973** 2.01842** 2.12352** 1.98847** 2.13802** 2.00325** 2.0261**
(5.24) (4.86) (5.32) (4.95) (5.26) (4.88) (5.29) (4.92) (4.97)
Ln (state banking assets) 0.39837** 0.40227** 0.39548** 0.3994** 0.40159** 0.40553** 0.40195** 0.40583** 0.4028**
(8.70) (8.78) (8.63) (8.72) (8.77) (8.86) (8.79) (8.87) (8.80)
Number of banks in state 0.00012 0.00017+ 0.00012 0.00017+ 0.00011 0.00016+ 0.00011 0.00016+ 0.00016+
(1.31) (1.80) (1.31) (1.80) (1.24) (1.74) (1.21) (1.71) (1.72)
Merger wave (0/1) 0.65619** 0.61** 0.67052** 0.62475** 0.64644** 0.59952** 0.64728** 0.60044** 0.6144**
(14.04) (12.43) (14.31) (12.71) (13.77) (12.16) (13.81) (12.21) (12.44)
Constant 7.80881** 6.77327** 7.76602** 6.74514** 7.765** 6.71777** 7.90997** 6.86489** 6.82189**
(12.11) (9.42) (12.04) (9.38) (12.04) (9.33) (12.25) (9.54) (12.44)
Observations 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918
Number of banks 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936
Chi square 2015.67 2021.12 2024.83 2030.27 2019.32 2024.81 2024.43 2029.93 2035.16
Two-tail for controls, one-tail for hypothesized effects; Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
C. Marquis et al. / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 130–145 141deregulation in 1994 is also an important spur for ﬁrms to look outside, but not within, their state of headquarters for acqui-
sition targets.
Banks from states with fewer banks and lower banking assets acquire more banks, both inside and outside the state, than
banks from states with more or larger banks, which may be an indication that most acquisitions are small. There are also
more acquisitions within state in states with proportionally more urban areas and lower per capita income, and by banks
that are not headquartered in a MSA.
The results of our investigation into effects of the CRA ratings of individual banks and state-level investment on LIHTCs
are consistent with our theory of how states help organizations address ambiguous federal regulations. CRA ratings are
ambiguous and hence the highest performing ﬁrms are less likely to acquire other banks. Further, our analyses show federal
and state activity around the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit to be one of the strongest predictors of bank merger activity
between 1990 and 2000. Thus, some states found ways to increase bank acquisitions within their borders in the face of fed-
eral regulatory mandates that acted as a constraint on such activity.5. Discussion and conclusions
After a century of progressive deregulation of banking markets, one signiﬁcant remaining impediment to bank expansion
is the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which is dependent upon how well banks serve low-income communities. A re-
sponse to public umbrage over banks’ unfair treatment of low-income communities, the CRA has become one of the key
ways the federal government assesses whether banks are meeting their social obligations by treating all communities fairly.
It has also become one of the key indices considered by the federal government in approving bank mergers; thus enforce-
ment of this social provision relies on the degree to which the government is able to constrain banks’ acquisitions.
As we have shown, CRA ratings determine to a signiﬁcant degree whether banks engage in acquisitions. Public and gov-
ernmental scrutiny of banks with low CRA ratings is an impediment to acquisitions, but a further unintended consequence is
Table 3
Models of banks acquiring outside state of headquarters. (DV: count of acquisitions).
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VII Model VIII
Low CRA rating (0/1) 0.27857 0.28454 0.201
(0.27) (0.28) (3.40)
High CRA rating (0/1) 0.61736** 0.61331**
(3.41) (3.38)
Moderate CRA rating (0/1) 0.61515** 0.61125** 0.616**
(3.43) (3.41) (3.40)
Ln (State Low Income
Housing Tax Credit)
0.40924* 0.40941* 0.39509* 0.39536* 0.39527+
(1.90) (1.90) (1.84) (1.84) (1.84)
ROE 0.03675 0.03693 0.03668 0.03686 0.03623 0.03629 0.03606 0.03613 0.03616
(1.51) (1.46) (1.51) (1.45) (1.42) (1.36) (1.41) (1.35) (1.35)
Ln (total assets) 0.99508** 0.99378** 0.99426** 0.99293** 1.03633** 1.03462** 1.03449** 1.03275** 1.0335**
(21.07) (21.00) (21.02) (20.95) (21.36) (21.29) (21.38) (21.31) (21.25)
HQ in MSA (0/1) 0.17225 0.18064 0.17443 0.18294 0.13767 0.14661 0.14258 0.1516 0.150
(0.67) (0.70) (0.68) (0.71) (0.54) (0.57) (0.56) (0.59) (0.58)
State unit banking law
(0/1)
15.05432 15.01773 14.91063 15.0036 13.74874 13.93426 13.70265 14.0133 14.0402
(0.5) (0.8) (0.1) (0.2) (0.7) (0.6) (0.9) (0.0) (0.0)
State per capita income
(2001 $s)
0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002
(0.15) (0.57) (0.15) (0.57) (0.04) (0.64) (0.04) (0.64) (0.64)
Ln (total state population) 0.2056 0.17233 0.20629 0.17177 0.21666 0.14662 0.21813 0.14539 0.14556
(1.55) (0.72) (1.55) (0.72) (1.63) (0.61) (1.64) (0.61) (0.61)
Percent state population in
urban areas
0.13514 0.06115 0.12966 0.06671 0.28697 0.0938 0.27564 0.08253 0.08627
(0.14) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07) (0.29) (0.10) (0.28) (0.08) (0.09)
Ln (state banking assets) 0.33604** 0.33448** 0.33497** 0.33336** 0.32828** 0.32671** 0.32606** 0.32444** 0.3249**
(3.56) (3.53) (3.55) (3.51) (3.49) (3.46) (3.46) (3.43) (3.44)
Number of banks in state 0.00083* 0.00077* 0.00083* 0.00077* 0.00081* 0.00076* 0.00081* 0.00075* 0.00075*
(2.45) (2.28) (2.45) (2.27) (2.40) (2.23) (2.39) (2.22) (2.22)
Merger wave (0/1) 1.1154** 1.03828** 1.1104** 1.033** 1.16301** 1.08662** 1.15241** 1.07573** 1.0788**
(4.84) (4.47) (4.81) (4.44) (5.04) (4.66) (5.00) (4.62) (4.62)
Constant 10.98718** 13.35323** 10.97879** 13.34573** 11.14984** 13.41186** 11.7455** 14.00539** 14.016**
(6.65) (6.39) (6.65) (6.39) (6.72) (6.43) (7.01) (6.68) (6.68)
Observations 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918 91918 6.86489**
Number of banks 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936 12936 (9.54)
Chi square 811.02 812.08 810.77 811.84 826.08 827.42 825.58 826.94 827.24
Two-tail for controls, one-tail for hypothesized effects; Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
142 C. Marquis et al. / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 130–145that banks with high CRA ratings, i.e. those that are serving their communities well, are constrained in their pursuit of acqui-
sitions out of fear of jeopardizing their clean records. While other institutional research on effects of legal ambiguity has
shown how ambiguity provides opportunity for interested organizations (Edelman, 1990, 1992), in our case, because the
CRA rating is ambiguous there is considerable risk and uncertainty involved in acquisitions for highly rated ﬁrms. Thus, this
federal legislation has the dual effect of encouraging banks to improve their ratings but suppressing acquisition activity
among banks that earn the highest ratings.
The supplementary results comparing low and high CRA ratings further suggest that the intended and unintended effects
of CRA regulation on acquisition activity are contingent on whether acquisition targets are in the same state or in different
states. These models showed that low CRA-rated banks are signiﬁcantly less likely than high-rated banks to perform within-
state acquisitions but not out-of-state acquisitions. The difference may result from different behavior of either type of bank
(or of both types) in those two contexts. Banks with low CRA ratings may feel more constrained in within-state acquisitions
because in those cases the banks may face greater local opposition than they do when they intend to acquire banks in more
distant acquisitions where the reputation of the bank may be less known. On the other hand, banks with high CRA ratings
may be more constrained in out-of-state acquisitions because in distant locations they would beneﬁt less from the local
goodwill engendered by their CRA activities. These contingent effects reinforce the overarching theme of the paper, which
suggest that there are important state-level inﬂuences on the effects of federal regulation on bank acquisitions.
Furthermore, an important part of the story is how states have actively helped banks deal with this ambiguity by provid-
ing a tool to help them address their CRA obligations. We highlight how a key tension underlies state activities in that they
are both protectors of the public good and facilitators of local economies. They achieve this second goal in part by encour-
aging bank consolidation within their borders, thus shaping banking behavior and industry structure. As noted, banks can
fulﬁll the mandate of ‘‘serving’’ low-income communities in various ways. The main approaches used in the late 1970s
and early 1980s were philanthropy and charitable activities. Then, in the late-1980s, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) changed how corporations met CRA obligations. Investing in low-income communities became one of the primary
ways for banks to boost their CRA ratings. States control the level of LIHTC activity within their borders. Those that have
taken an activist approach to using the LIHTC to foster the development of low-income housing are better sites for capital
C. Marquis et al. / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 130–145 143consolidation because they host a set of lucrative resources for banks to meet their CRA obligations. Our qualitative data,
indicates the LIHTC is inﬂuential in addressing CRA performance for acquisitions approvals. Our statistical results show that
states that actively promote markets for LIHTCs and the development of low-income housing are thus more attractive for
bank acquisitions, and that states that do not essentially (though perhaps unwittingly) drive banks out. This case illuminates
the complexities of states’ responsibilities with regard to creating a positive environment for the corporate sector and simul-
taneously allocating resources for the provision of public goods.
Theoretically, we have utilized the tools of organizational theory to unpack this tension and better understand how dif-
fering layers of social regulation can have unintended effects. Over the last 20 years, organizational theory has shown a sig-
niﬁcant amount of evidence that corporations respond to shifting institutional environments by experimenting with new
practices that are then afﬁrmed by the regulatory bodies they face (Kalev et al., 2006; see also Edelman, 1990, 1992). And
we further show here that ambiguous regulations can serve as a constraint on corporate activities. There have also been
growing bodies of work showing that individual states also create different local institutional arrangements to attract and
regulate capital (Marquis and Huang, 2009). What we add to this literature is the argument that there is a dynamic nature
to this relationship in which not only corporations, but also states seize upon opportunities—for example a change in the tax
code that was originally intended for a different purpose—to ﬁnd creative ways to consolidate and retain capital within their
borders. When ambiguous regulations are passed, corporations must ﬁnd ways to comply with the regulatory pressures they
face. In some cases, their creative solutions to these problems can be best facilitated by states, which have the resources and
local regulatory power to take advantage of certain institutional opportunities.
While the evolution of the institutional arrangements described here are in many ways speciﬁc to the banking industry
and the speciﬁc institutions that emerged to deal with the crisis of urban America in the middle of the 20th century, we feel
the general model that we have presented is quite generalizable. An implication of our research that applies more broadly is
that the following stages are important to understanding organizational response to US federal legislation and the regulation
of industries: (1) the Federal government produces legislation that mandates general types of ﬁrm behaviors; (2) corpora-
tions then seek creative ways to comply with this legislation; (3) states, like ﬁrms have interests in ﬁnding solutions to reg-
ulation because they want to consolidate and retain capital within corporations into their borders. So states sometimes play
a role in this process by passing legislation or adopting institutional strategies that help corporations navigate the pressures
of the federal landscape. While our case is speciﬁc to the banking industry, the process we describe here can be found in the
evolution of many other institutional ﬁelds.
Take, for example, the historical evolution of labor laws in the United States. In 1935, the federal government passed the
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), guaranteeing workers the rights to unionize and engage in collective bargaining.
For 12 years, this Act deﬁned labor relations in the United States. However, under growing pressure from corporations to
limit union power, the House and Senate pushed forward the Taft-Hartley Amendment (over Truman’s veto), a provision that
then established the framework for states to pass right-to-work statutes, effectively limiting union power in their jurisdic-
tions, an institutional change that 21 states had taken advantage of by 1965. There is a large literature and longstanding de-
bate over the actual effects of Taft-Hartley and right-to-work statutes on state economies (Cebula, 1983; Green, 1951;
Lumsden and Petersen, 1975; Palomba and Palomba, 1971; Reynolds and Edwards, 1986; Witte, 1948). However, the more
general issues we are interested in here are the multiple layers of institutions and the various organizational and institu-
tional actors that have come together to shape the current system.
Our results show that when one regulator (the state) has a vested interest in an outcome pursued by a corporation (an
acquisition) that is controlled by another regulator (say, the Federal Reserve), the situation lends itself to those two regula-
tors working at cross-purposes. Having multiple regulators, each with conﬂicting interests and goals, is a recipe for a busi-
ness, which tends to have much sharper objectives, to develop more latitude to get its way, perhaps by co-opting one of the
regulators, or by setting one against the other. Additionally, one of the regulators may upstage the other by aligning its goals
with the business and by facilitating the exploitation of the ambiguities inherent in the policies of the other regulator.
Questions suggested by this study for future research include: What are the conditions under which state and national
governments coordinate and integrate their goals, and present a uniﬁed front to their constituencies, rather than work at
cross-purposes? Under what conditions will corporations play one regulator against the other in order to receive the greatest
amount of autonomy and incentives? When multiple regulators with diverse goals have an interest in certain corporations,
how can they best incentivize socially conscious corporate behavior? And further, under what conditions will regulation at
one level produce unintended consequences that will jeopardize a mechanism of social legislation at another level?
Corporations and states are often engaged in a complex dance choreographed, on the one hand, to attract capital and, on
the other, to limit or regulate certain aspects of corporate behavior. States have both a regulatory mission to serve the public
interest and economic incentives to facilitate activity that conﬂicts with other regulations. The broader historical narrative of
which this case is part suggests that for much of US history banks have grown by circumventing laws intended to restrict
their locations and expansion, and that self interested states and state agencies have played a behind the scenes role in facil-
itating this growth.References
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